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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1794, a Pennsylvania physician was sued for medical negli-
gence arising out of his treatment of yellow fever victims in what
may have been the first American medical malpractice case. The
defendant's name was Dr. Benjamin Rush-best known as a signer
of our Declaration of Independence.' Although malpractice cases
were rare prior to World War II, history records that one Illinois
physician had the distinction of being defended in 1860 by a vigor-
ous young lawyer named Abraham Lincoln.2 The right of a patient
to sue a physician is not a recent aberration of American law and it
is, in fact, well established in our legal system.
Physicians, like all humans, are prone to act negligently from
time to time-despite the best of intentions-and that negligence
* B.A. 1974, Duke University, J.D. 1981, University of North Carolina School
of Law, recently retired from position as partner in the law firm of McCain &
Essen, a firm specializing in medical negligence cases.
** B.A. 1981, Duke University, J.D. 1985, University of North Carolina
School of Law, associated with the firm of McCain & Essen.
1. Warren, Medical Malpractice in the United States of America, in MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE (J. Taylor ed. 1980); see also Sandor, The History of Profes-
sional Liability Suits in the United States, 1957 J. AM. MED. A. 163, 459.
2. For a discussion of the increased amount of medical malpractice litigation
after World War II, see U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., SUBCOMMITTEE ON EXECUTIVE REOR-
GANIZATION, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
D.H.E.W. Publ. No. (DS) 73-78 (1973). The case defended by Abraham Lincoln
was Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 385 (1860). Despite Lincoln's representation, the phy-
sician lost the trial and appeal.
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will sometimes cause injury to other persons. Our legal system has
concluded that as between the innocent victim and the negligent
tortfeasor, the cost of injury should be borne by the negligent
party. As a democratic country, the United States has attempted
to apply this precept in its legal system to all segments of our soci-
ety-from white-coated physicians to blue-collar truck drivers, and
even to pinstriped attorneys. Despite the fact that the viability of
medical negligence claims has been established for centuries in our
legal system, attorneys have only recently obtained more than oc-
casional success in the courtroom in obtaining recoveries for the
victims of medical negligence. 3 Since physicians (like truck drivers,
attorneys and other members of society) are generally insured
against acts of negligence, most of the debate concerning malprac-
tice has centered on the cost and availability of malpractice
insurance.
In the late 1960s, plaintiffs' attorneys were beginning to suc-
cessfully litigate medical negligence cases in a few states, and by
1969, a United States Senate subcommittee reported a marked in-
crease in state legislation concerning medical malpractice.4 By
1975, insurance companies sought significant increases in premi-
ums for medical negligence coverage. 5 In the mid-1970s, the St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company insured over ninety per-
cent of the physicians and surgeons practicing in North Carolina
and in September 1975, that company stated that it had decided to
cease offering such coverage in North Carolina. The North Caro-
lina Medical Society helped form a competing malpractice in-
suror-Medical Mutual Insurance Company of North Caro-
lina-and interestingly, St. Paul soon dropped its threats of
3. As late as 1976, a North Carolina General Assembly Study Commission
was able to report: "It is no accident that the St. Paul Insurance Company in
defending medical malpractice claims over approximately twenty years has never
lost a jury trial in the entire State of North Carolina." NORTH CAROLINA PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY COMMISSION, MINORITY REPORT 4 (March 12,
1976)(hereinafter STUDY COMMISSION MINORITY REPORT), cited in Dixon v. Peters,
63 N.C. App. 592, 599, 306 S.E.2d 477, 481-82 (1983). Warren, supra note 1.
4. SUBCOMMITTEE ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE
PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1969.
5. The following articles are a handful of the many which appeared in the
mid-1970's stating the marked increase in insurance premiums: Owens, How
Much Have Medical Insurance Premiums Gone Up, MEDICAL ECONOMICs, Dec.
27, 1976, at 102-08; NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE-
PORT, Jan. 20, 1975, at 53.
[Vol. 8:241
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leaving North Carolina." Nevertheless, the question of lawsuits
against physicians became a highly charged emotional issue in the
mid-1970s and in some areas physicians responded to the insur-
ance problems by threatening to close their offices, while hospitals
threatened to admit only emergency patients.7 Indeed, in San
Francisco, New York City, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin
and Texas, physicians actually withheld medical services and held
public demonstrations."
Commentators and critics disagreed in their assessment of
who or what was to blame for the medical malpractice insurance
crisis. Proponents of the medical profession and the insurance in-
dustry blamed insurance premium increases on the number of
medical malpractice actions as well as on larger verdicts in those
actions.9 Various scholars and public interest/consumer rights
groups, on the other hand, pointed a sharp finger at the medical
profession and the insurance industry.'0 In the mid-1970s, the
American Medical Association and the insurance industry lobbied
heavily in many states advocating legislative relief in the area of
medical negligence.'
In North Carolina, a Professional Liability Insurance Study
Commission was appointed, and that Commission filed a lengthy
report with the General Assembly on March 12, 1976."2 Interest-
ingly, "the regular voting membership of the Study Commission
during its extended deliberations consisted of two doctors, two in-
surance company representatives, a hospital administrator and a
6. NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY COMMISSION
REPORT (1976)(hereinafter STUDY COMMISSION REPORT); S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN
AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE (1978).
7. Warren, supra note 1, at 162.
8. Id.
9. For a general discussion of how all groups affected by the medical mal-
practice problem blame other groups, see Warren, supra note 1, at 462-63.
10. The consumer point of view has been advocated by, among others, the
Public Citizen Health Research Group. In a recent report, the Group lambasted
the medical profession for not disciplining their members who have committed
negligent acts. Public Citizen Health Research Group Report, Medical Malprac-
tice: The Need for Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Reform (1985) (printed by
Public Citizen, Suite 605, 2000 P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
11. For a comparison between the situation in the mid-1970s and the mid-
1980s, see Association of Trial Lawyers of America, The American Medical Asso-
ciation is Wrong-There Is No Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis (1985)
(published by A.T.L.A., 1050 31st Street, N.W., Washinton, D.C. 20007-4499).
12. STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6.
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pharmacist. 1 3 Virtually all of the witnesses called by the Study
Commission were representatives of insurance companies or the
medical profession and, not surprisingly, the Commission made
numerous recommendations for legislative change in the area of
medical negligence lawsuits."'
Following the Study Commission report, the North Carolina
General Assembly enacted the following legislation:
1. A special professional statute of limitations.'5
2. A statutory "same or similar communities" standard of
care for medical negligence cases intended to stave off judicial
adoption of nationwide standards."6
3. An informed consent statute which precludes recovery if a
"reasonable person" would have consented if properly informed,
regardless of the preferences of the individual.' 7
4. A statute which precludes an action against a physician on
a guarantee unless the guarantee was in writing. 8
5. A rule of procedure prohibiting any public ad damnum
clause in excess of $10,000 to avoid publicity regarding large
claims.19
Interestingly, even before the legislation adopted by the various
state legislatures had time to take effect, the clamor of malpractice
"crisis" evaporated as quickly as it had formed.20
After the dust had settled, various investigators began to ex-
amine the information which had been provided to the North Car-
olina General Assembly and other legislatures by the insurance in-
dustry, the American Medical Association and other medical
13. STUDY COMMISSION MINORITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
14. STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6. Although many of the Study
Commission recommendations were enacted into statute (see infra note 15-19 and
accompanying text) the recommendations for modification of the collateral source
rule and for giving trial courts the discretion to award periodic payments did not
result in legislation (and these proposals are expected to receive particular atten-
tion in the coming legislative discussions).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1983). See Roberts v. Durham Co. Hosp., 56 N.C.
App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982), afl'd, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983)(up-
holding constitutionality of statute).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a) (1985). See Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App.
592, 306 S.E.2d 477 (1983)(upholding constitutionality of statute).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(d) (1985).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(2) (1983).
20. Medical Malpractice Legislation: Laws Based on a False Premise, TRIAL,
Jan. 1985, at 65.
[Vol. 8:241
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lobbyists. 21 Essentially, the information which had been provided
to the various state legislatures while they were considering tort
"reform" proposals in the mid-1970s tended to support the physi-
cians' claim that they were paying higher insurance premiums and
the insurance companies' assertion that they were losing money.
The problem with calculating profits for malpractice insurors is
that claims are seldom reported or paid the same year in which
premiums purchase that coverage, and some investigators asserted
that the insurance companies had not provided fair information in
their lobbying for legislative reforms.2 2 The complaint by the St.
21. See, e.g., infra notes 22-23.
22. See, TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUS-
TRY NEVER WANTED YOU TO KNOW 31 (1982), portions quoted in Dixon v. Peters,
63 N.C. App. 592, 600, 306 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1983):
The point is that for lines like malpractice that have a "long tale," where
years may pass before final losses are known (auto liability and product
liability being two other prime examples), the 'profits' insurers report are
little more than guesses; those guesses are often conservative; and the
cash that sits around to be invested in the meantime is a gold mine.
In figuring profits-which a company has to do, among other things,
to pay taxes-insurers must guess at the "severity" of claims not yet set-
tled. Will they cost, on average, $20,000 or $200,000? Hard enough. But
they also must guess at the "frequency" of claims that will be, but have
not yet been, made. Will there be 200 claims-or 2,000? By multiplying
its guess on the number of claims not yet made by its guess as to how
much the average claim will cost, it arrives at an estimate of losses.
These "losses"-guesses that you or I might round off to the nearest $10
million, but that the St. Paul and its competitors round off to the nearest
dollar-come under the heading 'IBNR.' Incurred But Not Reported.
They are treated like any other cost of doing business, as if the cash were
actually out the door. IBNR: as much a part of insurance accounting as
RBI is part of baseball.
If time proves these estimates to have been conservative, an adjust-
ment will be made and additional profit reported. And taxed. But in the
meantime, the insurer has use of the money.
From 1975 through 1978, during the early part of which the nation
was suffering a crisis in the availability of malpractice insurance because
insurers felt they were not being paid adequately for the risk, the St.
Paul took in $415 million in malpractice premiums and paid out $27 mil-
lion in claims and claims-settlement expenses. Even so, in the Fall of
1978, a St. Paul executive told the Conference of Insurance Legislators
(an association of state legislators) that St. Paul has lost money in medi-
cal malpractice throughout 1975, but that the line had been "generally
profitable" during 1976 and 1977. All of this was based on estimates and
assumptions, presumably made in good faith, that only time could cor-
roborate. (At the time of the speech, $52.7 million in premiums had been
5
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Paul Insurance Company, through the Study Commission, that it
was losing money on malpractice insurance in North Carolina
seems to have been more accounting fiction than evidence of a real
"malpractice crisis" and one fascinating study of malpractice in-
surance notes that:
There is some evidence indicating that in recent years the
malpractice insurance industry has overstated the reserves set
aside for reported claims. For example, in 1974, when St. Paul
requested an 82 percent rate increase for North Carolina, a task
force from the State Insurance Department made an on-site re-
view of the company's claims files at its home and local offices. Its
examination concluded that claims reserves for claims actually
paid were overstated by 33 percent, and that 19 percent of all
reserves were held for claims which were settled without
payment.23
Following the legislative reforms of the mid-1970s in North
Carolina, medical malpractice insurance rarely made headlines and
the two active medical malpractice insurers-St. Paul and Medical
Mutual-seemed to prosper. In 1982, representatives of North Car-
olina's physician-owned Medical Mutual Insurance Company
noted that since the company was formed in 1975, it had actually
been able to reduce premium rates so that only with the most re-
cent increases were physicians paying as much as they had been in
1975.4 Another representative of Medical Mutual Insurance Com-
pany noted that North Carolina physicians enjoyed the lowest pre-
collected for 1975 but only about $6 million actually paid out.)
By the end of 1980, it had begun to appear that 1975 had not been
such a loser, after all. Of the $52.7 million the St. Paul had collected in
premiums, $15.5 million had been paid out in losses and legal fees; only
an estimated $9.2 million remained to be paid. Losses and loss expenses
actually paid for the years 1975 through 1978-against total premiums of
$415 million-had climbed to $78 million. Even after a hefty $87 million
in selling and administrative expense, that still left a quarter of a billion
dollars.
Plus interest. No listing is given in the annual statement to insur-
ance regulators to show how much interest the St. Paul had earned, tax-
free, in municipal bonds, on top of that quarter billion. As of the end of
1980, it must have totaled in the neighborhood of an additional $75
million.
23. S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 6, at 182, quoted in Dixon, 63 N.C. App.
at 600, 306 S.E.2d at 482.
24. Durham Morning Herald, Apr. 25, 1982, at 1.
[Vol. 8:241
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miums for medical malpractice of any state in the United States.2 5
During the approximately ten years since the last scramble of
intense national debate over medical malpractice actions, the
American Medical Association has been quietly planning strategy
and raising funds. According to the Federal Election Commission,
the American Medical Association's PAC, AMPAC, was the fifth
wealthiest political action committee in the United States for the
1983-84 election cycle, posting receipts of $4 million.2 6 In the cate-
gory of Professional Societies, AMPAC was by far the wealthiest,
representing almost one third of the total funding for the top fifty
PACs in the Professional Societies category. Indeed, of those top
fifty PACs in the Professional Societies category, only one, the
PAC of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, represented
the legal profession and the trial bar, while the remaining forty-
nine represented medical and dental societies.2
By the mid-1980s, the American Medical Association and the
insurance industry were issuing frequent press releases tending to
support their contention that a new malpractice crisis had ar-
rived.18 Much of the media effort has been aimed at projecting the
image that malpractice premiums are responsible for high medical
costs in America. However, the A.M. Best Company, which studies
the insurance industry, reports that total health care costs in the
United States in 1983 were $355.4 billion, and malpractice insur-
ance premiums for that year cost a total of $1.5 billion; in other
words, the total cost of medical malpractice claims in 1983 (includ-
ing monies paid to defense attorneys, plaintiffs' attorneys, insur-
ance company employees and victims themselves) was less that one
half of one percent of the cost of health care in the United States.
That amounts to only $6.08 for the average citizen for that year.2 9
25. Id. See also Briggs, Medical Malpractice: The Phantom Crisis, TRIAL
BRIEFS, Vol. 16:1, 1985, at 1, citing N.C. INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS OFFICE, 1984
ANNUAL REPORT and A.M. BEST CO., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT.
26. 1985 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT, cited in A.T.L.A. POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEE, QUARTERLY REPORT 1 (Winter, 1986).
27. Id.
28. Beginning in October 1984, the American Medical Association Special
Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance published three heavily publi-
cized reports entitled Professional Liability in the 80's (Report I and Report II)
and A.M.A. Special Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance Action
Plan (calling for an "intensive" public relations campaign), which were the cor-
nerstone for the A.M.A. media campaign.
29. A.M. BEST, CASUALTY Loss RESERVE DEVELOPMENT (1978), cited in TRIAL,
January 1986, at 5. See also Gibson & Robert, National Health Expenditures,
19861
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In attempting to justify large rate increases, insurance compa-
nies have projected the myth that large jury verdicts have caused
disastrous drains on the assets of insurance companies. Interest-
ingly, as of June 1985, the A.M. Best Company reported that the
property/casualty stock index had increased in value 47 percent
over the previous 2/2 years30 indicating that Wall Street investors
clearly believe that the insurance industry is healthy.
Nevertheless, the American Medical Association and the in-
surance industry have orchestrated a nationwide lobbying effort
for malpractice "reform" legislation intended to promote lower in-
surance premiums by curtailing the rights of the medical malprac-
tice victim.3 1 The 1985 North Carolina General Assembly created a
"North Carolina Medical Malpractice Study Commission," and
that Commission is currently considering various proposals ad-
vanced by the American Medical Association, including the
following:
(1) A ceiling, or cap, on non-economic damages (pain and
suffering);
(2) Limitations on attorneys' contingent fees;
(3) Periodic payments of large damages rather that lump sum
awards;
(4) Elimination of the collateral source rule.32
This article examines these legislative proposals in the context of
constitutional challenges and general American tort law.
II. CEILINGS ON RECOVERY
One goal of American tort law is to fairly and fully compensate
the victims of negligence for their injuries. As the North Carolina
Supreme Court has expressed, "[tihe plaintiff is entitled to recover
the present worth of all damages naturally and proximately result-
1983, 6 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (Winter 1984).
30. Id.
31. The Medical Malpractice War, National Law Journal, August 27, 1984,
at 1. Concerning the A.M.A. effort, see, e.g., Physicians Report Insurance Crisis,
News & Observer, July 16, 1984, at 1C.
32. Maxwell, The Crisis Arrives in North Carolina, TRIAL BRIEFS 10 (Vol.
16:3, 1985) (published by the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, Box 767,
Raleigh, N.C. 17602). The A.M.A. recommendations are contained in A.M.A. Spe-
cial Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance Action Plan, (Feb.
1985).
[Vol. 8:241
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ing from defendant's tort."33 Much of the clamor over "tort re-
form" has centered on proposals to put a statutory cap or ceiling
on the amount of damages a plaintiff can receive. Although a few
proposals limit all damages, the more typical approach is to try to
limit non-economic (general) damages.
Out-of-pocket expenses like lost wages and medical expenses
can be calculated with some certainty. We simply cannot use an
adding machine to calculate the value of a loss of the ability to see
our surroundings, to talk to our loved ones, to rise out of bed and
walk, to breathe without a respirator, to live free from agonizing
pain, or simply to enjoy the myriad of sensations which constitute
life. Our jury system has evolved, in part, to allow citizens to place
a value on such non-economic damages and other forms of human
suffering.
Making the victim whole is a cornerstone principle of all dam-
ages law. The suggestion that a certain class of tort vic-
tims-namely, the most seriously injured victims of medical negli-
gence-should be deprived of the full monetary recovery which is
available to all other members of our society, seems repugnant to
the Constitution, our system of tort law, and any concept of funda-
mental fairness. Nevertheless, the AMA task force and the insur-
ance industry began to press in the mid-1970s for a legislatively
imposed ceiling, or cap, on the amount of such non-economic dam-
ages which a jury could award.34 Indeed, over a third of the state
legislatures were persuaded to adopt such ceilings on recovery.15
The various statutes enacted by the state legislatures vary in
33. King v. Britt, 267 N.C. 594, 148 S.E.2d 594 (1966).
34. For a general review of limitations on recovery, see Richards, Statutes
Limiting Medical Malpractice Damages, F.I.C. QUARTERLY 247 (Spring, 1982).
35. State legislatures which have enacted statutes imposing limitations on re-
covery include the following: (a) California [CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (West
1970)]; (b) Florida [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54(2)(b) (West Supp. 1985)]; (c) Idaho
[IDAHO CODE § 39-4205 (repealed 1985)]; (d) Illinois [ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 70,
101 (1975)]; (e) Indiana [IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (1976 & Supp. 1977)]; (f) Louisi-
ana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299:39 (West Supp. 1986)]; (g) Montana [MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 2-9-104 (1977)]; (h) Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2825, -
2829 (1984)]; (i) New Hampshire [N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 11 (1983)]; (j)
New Mexico [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-7 (1982)]; (k) North Dakota [N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.40.1-11 (1978)]; (1) Ohio [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1981)];
(m) Oregon [OR. REV. STAT. §§ 752.040, .060 (1985)]; (n) South Dakota [S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1985)]; (o) Texas [TEx. STAT. ANN. § 11.02
(1975)]; (p) Virginia [VA. CODE § 8.01-581-1 (1984)]; (q) Wisconsin [WIs. STAT. §§
655.23, .27 (1980)].
1986] 249
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the types of damages which they limit. Some of the statutes limit
the total award to any one victim, even if that award is less than
the total amount of economic damages incurred for lost wages,
medical expenses, and the like. 8 Other statutes place a cap only on
non-economic (general) damages or on non-medical damages.3 7
Some statutory schemes place a ceiling on the amount recoverable
from any individual health care provider. 38
Most of the statutes limiting the liability of a health care pro-
vider have also implemented a Patient Compensation Fund-a
state-sponsored fund to provide for recovery of damages in excess
of the health care provider's liability.39 However, most of these Pa-
tient Compensation Funds impose a ceiling on the aggregate
amount of recovery available. At least one state has enacted a stat-
ute limiting the total amount of damages any individual physician
can be held liable for in a single year.40 In addition to variations in
the types of damages covered, the state statutes also differ in the
amount of the ceiling which they impose. 41
36. Among the states placing a limitation on overall recovery in medical mal-
practice cases are the following: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, North
Dakota, Ohio, and Virginia. See supra, note 35.
37. Among the states imposing a limitation on non-economic damages in
medical malpractice actions are the following: California, Montana, and New
Hampshire. See supra note 35.
38. Among the states imposing a limitation on health care providers' liability
in medical malpractice actions are the following: Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See supra note 35.
39. Of the eight states listed supra, note 38, which have enacted statutes im-
posing limitations on health care providers' liability, only one, Idaho, does not
have some kind of excess liability fund.
40. Wisconsin has enacted as statute which placed an annual aggregate ceil-
ing on a health care provider's liability at $600,000. See WIs. STAT. § 655.23
(Supp. 1985).
41. (a) California: $250,000 on non-economic damages; (b) Florida: $500,000
per claim (escalates by $50,000 each July lst)/$500,000 per occurrence; (c) Idaho:
$300,000 limit on aggregate recovery; (d) Illinois: $500,000 on aggregate recovery;
(e) Indiana: $300,000 on aggregate recovery; (f) Louisiana: $500,000 on aggregate
recovery; (g) Montana: state not liable for any non-economic damages in a medi-
cal malpractice action; (h) Nebraska: $100,000 per health care provider; (i) New
Hampshire: $250,000 limit on non-economic damages; (j) New Mexico: $500,000
limit per incident except for punitive damages and medical expenses; (k) North
Dakota: $300,000 limit per occurrence; (1) Ohio: $200,000 on general damages in
non-death cases; (m) Oregon: limitation on health care provider liability; $100,000
per claim and $300,000 per occurrence; (n) South Dakota: $500,000 limit on gen-
eral damages; (o) Texas: $500,000 limit on non-medical expenses/damages; (p)
Virginia: $1,000,000 limit on total recovery; (q) Wisconsin: $200,000 per practi-
[Vol. 8:241
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Despite individual differences in the state statutes limiting
medical malpractice recovery, they all raise constitutional ques-
tions, including equal protection and substantive due process. The
constitutionality of ceilings on damages in medical malpractice ac-
tions has been challenged in almost every state where such legisla-
tion has been passed. 42 The majority of the state courts which have
considered the question have struck down the statutes limiting re-
covery as unconstitutional.3
The decisions have generally recognized that ceilings on recov-
ery in medical malpractice actions create at least three discrimina-
tory classifications: (1) the ceilings provide a benefit on health care
providers not available to other tortfeasors; (2) the ceilings impose
a restriction on victims of medical malpractice not required of
other tort victims; (3) the ceilings discriminate against medical
malpractice victims whose injuries exceed the specific limitations
(who receive only partial compensation) in favor of those victims
who suffer relatively minor damages (who are allowed full recov-
ery).44 In addition to creating discriminating classifications, these
ceilings on damages infringe on the medical malpractice victim's
right to sue in tort for full recovery guaranteed by the substantive
tioner per incident. See supra note 35.
42. Of the 17 states which have enacted statutes limiting recovery in medical
malpractice actions, at least 12 have addressed the constitutionality of these stat-
utes. Those states include the following: (a) California: Fein v. Permanente Medi-
cal Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). The United
States Supreme Court dismissed this case on appeal on the grounds that the Cali-
fornia statutory limit on non-economic damages raised no substantial federal
question. See Fein, 54 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1985)(No. 85-19); (b) Florida:
Fla. Medical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1983); (c)
Idaho: Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); (d)
Illinois: Wright v. Cent. Dupage Hospital Assoc., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); (e) Indiana: Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d
585 (1980); (f) Louisiana: Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So.
2d 149 (La. 1985); (g) Montana: White v. State, 661 Mont. 1272, 661 P.2d 1272
(1983); (h) Nebraska: Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977);
(i) New Hampshire: Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); (j)
North Dakota: Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); (k) Ohio: Simon v.
St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio St. 2d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); (1) Texas:
Baptist Hosp. of Southwest Tex. v. Baber, 672 S.E.2d 296 (Tex. App. 1984).
43. The following states have struck down the statutes limiting medical mal-
practice recovery: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, North Da-
kota, and Ohio. See supra note 42.
44. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980).
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due process provisions of our federal and state constitutions. 45
State courts have evaluated these discriminatory classifica-
tions and their infringements on medical malpractice victims'
rights under all three judicially recognized levels of scrutiny: strict
scrutiny,46 middle-tier, 47 and the rational basis test.48 Although the
tests have varied, the conclusions have generally been the same.
Most of the state courts have declared the statutes unconstitu-
tional because they found the connections tenuous between the un-
derlying legislative goals and the means chosen to implement the
goals.49
For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the legislative goal of decreasing the costs of the medical
injury reparations, but held that placing a $250,000 limit on medi-
cal malpractice victims' non-economic damages would do little to
achieve that goal.50 The court recognized that the amount of
money paid out in damage awards constitutes only a small part of
total insurance premium costs6 1 and noted further that few pa-
tients suffer non-economic damages in excess of $250,000.62 The
court went on to hold:
It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of sup-
porting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who
are the most severely injured and therefore most in need of
recovery.
3
An Ohio appellate court similarly rejected limitations on the
amount of recovery for medical malpractice victims, writing:
[T]here is no crisis, short of civil insurrection, sufficient to de-
prive, water down, or make less valuable the right to seek redress
of grievances, to a dollar amount fully compensating one for his
45. See, e.g., White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Mont. 1983).
46. See id.; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio St. 2d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976).
47. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
48. See Baptist Hosp. of Southwest Tex. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.
App. 1984).
49. Seven of the twelve states considering the constitutionality of statutes
limiting medical malpractice recovery have struck down this legislation as uncon-
stitutional. See supra notes 42-43.
50. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 944, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980).
51. Id. at 940, 424 A.2d at 836.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
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loss . . .
At least three state courts have upheld some type of limitation on
medical malpractice recovery (all under a rational basis test),55 al-
though one statute only applied to plaintiffs who voluntarily
agreed to be bound by an administrative panel5 6 and another stat-
ute applied only to malpractice claims against the state. 7
The proposals to limit recoveries are based on convincing leg-
islators that insurance companies are facing a crisis and that large
recoveries have a substantial impact on health care costs. As out-
lined in the introduction to this article, however, insurance compa-
nies at the current time are economically healthy and the total cost
of malpractice premiums is still less than one half of one percent of
the total cost of health care in the United States.58 Moreover, no
one has yet determined what impact malpractice cases have in en-
couraging responsible medical care and weaning out irresponsible
and incompetent practitioners. 59 Thus, there is simply no factual
justification for ceilings on recoveries as a means of slashing the
total cost of health care in America.
Proposals to place a ceiling on recoveries were made to the
North Carolina General Assembly in the 1970s and were rejected. 0
54. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903, 912 (Ohio 1976).
55. The following states have upheld the constitutionality of legislation plac-
ing limits on medical malpractice recovery: California, Louisiana, and Nebraska.
See supra note 42.
56. The Nebraska statute sets up a system whereby a medical malpractice
plaintiff voluntarily elects to have his or her claim tried by a malpractice panel. If
the plaintiff exercises this option, his or her recovery is subject to statutory limi-
tations. In upholding the constitutionality of this legislation placing ceilings on
recovery, the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized the voluntary nature of the
statute. See Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 116, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977).
57. The Louisiana statute places a ceiling on medical malpractice recovery
only in claims against the state. The Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that a
limitation on the state's liability for medical malpractice actions brought against
it was reasonably related to the goal of assuring the availability of affordable pub-
lic health care to citizens of the state. See Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 157 (La. 1985).
58. See text accompanying notes 29-30, supra.
59. In addition to providing damages to victims, another important goal of
tort law is to deter future acts of negligence. To the extent medical malpractice
litigation helps curb acts of medical negligence it also reduces the expense of pro-
viding nursing and physician care for those damaged victims of medical
negligence.
60. Even the 1976 Study Commission refused to endorse this proposal, writ-
ing: "Because of the question as to the constitutionality of an absolute limit on
1986] 253
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As outlined above, many state court decisions held that similar
statutes enacted in the mid-1970s were an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection because they singled out the victims of medical
negligence. Therefore, the American Medical Association and the
insurance industry are beginning to switch strategy and broaden
their demands to cover all tort victims-in the hopes of with-
standing constitutional challenge if the statutes are passed."1
When negligence leaves a victim to suffer daily for sixty to
seventy years, we cannot legislatively reduce that lifetime of tor-
ture to some fixed dollar amount proposed by the insurance carrier
or the tortfeasor. The concept that a tort victim should be fully
compensated for his injuries, to the extent possible by monetary
award, is absolutely central to our system of tort law; any attempt
to qualify that right is a serious threat to our tort system of trans-
ferring the burden of negligent acts from the victim to the
tortfeasor. The same rules of law should apply to those persons
who suffer minor injuries as to those persons who suffer cata-
strophic injuries, and it would be unfair and morally unjust to pe-
nalize those few negligence victims who suffer catastrophic injuries
by legislatively denying them the full protection of law.
III. LIMITATIONS ON CONTINGENT FEES
Attorneys' contingent fees are perhaps the most emotional as-
pect of malpractice cases in the eyes of many physicians. Unaware
of the months and years of pre-trial preparation, and without con-
sideration of the unsuccessful cases which result in no attorneys'
fees, these physicians are incensed that an attorney can emerge
from a two or three week malpractice trial with a large fee.62 Of
course, the fee is deducted from the jury's award to the plaintiff, in
accordance with the attorney's employment contract, so there can
be no direct savings to the physician or the insurance industry by a
statutory prohibition of, or a limitation on, such contingent fees.
Consumer groups or malpractice plaintiffs have not been critical of
the system of contingent fees, and it is obvious that the medical
recovery for malpractice, the Commission does not recommend legislation placing
a ceiling on damages." STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 32.
61. The Medical Malpractice War, National Law Journal, Aug. 27, 1984, at
9.
62. See, e.g., The Soaring Cost of Health Care, Charlotte Observer, Sept. 23,
1984, at B1; Priorities Noted in State Malpractice Relief Legislation, Ob. Gyn.
News, Feb. 1-14, 1985, at 2.
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insurance lobbyists are attacking contingent fees as an indirect
way of preventing malpractice victims from securing competent
representation in pursuing their claims.
The Rand Corporation conducted a study of the impact of
contingent fees in personal injury litigation in 1980 at the request
of the United States Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare.0 3 The study, written by Professor P.M. Danzon of Duke Uni-
versity, concluded that:
The analysis disputes the allegation that contingent fees result in
excessive (above competitive) awards for attorneys . . . . What
little empirical evidence is available confirms that, averaging over
cases won and lost, the effective hourly earnings of attorneys paid
on a contingent basis are similar to the hourly earnings of defense
attorneys paid by the hour.
Restriction on contingent fees would also tend to be regres-
sive, deterring low- and middle-income plaintiffs from filing even
meritorious suits .... Conversely, the common allegation that
the contingent fee induces attorneys to bring claims with little
legal merit has no basis in logic. The fact that the fee depends on
winning provides an incentive to screen out cases with little legal
merit-an incentive that is lacking with an hourly fee.
Even if the explicit policy objective were to reduce frequency of
suits, size of awards, and expenditure on litigation, it is doubtful
that limiting contingent fees is an efficient means of achieving
these results.4
Nevertheless, at least twenty states have passed legislation limiting
contingent fees in some respect.0 5
63. P. DANZON, CONTINGENCY FEES FOR PERSONAL LITIGATION (1980) (Health
Care Financing Administration, U.S. Dept. of Health, Ed. & Welfare).
64. Quoted in Self-Preservation of a Privileged Class: An Analysis of the
Florida Medical Association's Proposals to Further Insulate Medical Doctors
from Liability for Malpractice at 11 (The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers,
1982).
65. States which have passed legislation modifying contingent fees include
the following: (a) Arizona [ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1976)]; (b) California
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (1975)]; (c) Delaware [DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 18, §
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At present, no state has completely abolished the contingent
fee system in medical malpractice actions or in personal injury ac-
tions in general. The statutes which have been passed generally fall
into three categories. (1) Some statutes allow the trial court to de-
termine a reasonable contingent fee or, in the alternative, to review
the contractually agreed upon contingent fee for "reasonable-
ness."6 6 (2) Other statutes establish a fixed percentage for the con-
tingent fee, no matter what the amount of recovery.67 (3) Several
states have adopted a sliding scale contingent fee system, whereby
the percentage of fee taken by the attorney decreases as the total
amount of the award increases.6 8
All statutes which limit contingent fee contracts between med-
ical malpractice victims and their attorneys raise serious constitu-
tional questions. Possible equal protection violations occur, since
the limitations create classifications which discriminate against (1)
those tort victims who are injured by medical malpractice, (2)
those attorneys who represent medical malpractice plaintiffs, and
(3) those victims of medical malpractice who cannot afford to pay
attorneys up-front on an hourly basis.69 Whether judged under a
6865 (1976)]; (d) Florida [FLA. STAT. §§ 768.56, 575 (1980)]; (e) Hawaii [HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 671-2 (1976)]; (f) Idaho [IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (1975)]; (g) Illinois
[ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1109 (1981); (h) Indiana [IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1
(1975)]; (i) Iowa [IOWA CODE § 147.138 (1975)]; (j) Kansas [KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-
121(b) (1976)]; (k) Maryland [MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-07 (1981)];
(1) Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2834 (1976)]; (m) New Hampshire [N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN § 507-C:7 IV (1977)]; (n) New York [N.Y. JUD. § 474-a (1976)]; (o)
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT § 64 (1978)]; (p) Pennsylvania [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1301.604 (1976)]; (q) Tennessee [TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (1983)]; (r) Wash-
ington [WASH. REV CODE § 7.70.070 (1976)]; (s) Wisconsin [WiS. STAT. § 655.010
(1975)].
66. Statutes allowing trial courts to determine or review "reasonableness" of
contingent fees have been enacted in the following states: Arizona, Florida, Ha-
waii, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, and Washington. See supra note 65.
67. Statutes imposing fixed percentage limitations on contingent fees have
been enacted in the following states: California, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See supra note 65.
68. Statutes implementing sliding scale schemes with regard to attorney con-
tingent fees have been enacted in the following states: Florida, Illinois, New
Hampshire, and New York. See supra note 65.
69. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a statute imposing a scale
on attorneys' fees in medical malpractice actions violated equal protection guar-
antees. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 945, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (1980). The
court determined that the statute unfairly burdened medical malpractice plaintiff
attorneys. By making medical malpractice claims less attractive to attorneys, the
statute also burdened medical malpractice victims, making it more difficult for
[Vol. 8:241
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strict scrutiny, middle tier or rational basis test, the validity of
such statutes under an equal protection challenge depends, in large
part, on the degree to which such statutes are effective in reducing
health care costs and promoting the availability of good medical
care.
As noted above, the total cost of malpractice insurance premi-
ums constitutes less that one-half of one percent of the total cost
of health care in America and therefore, it is difficult to see how
the fee arrangement between malpractice victims and plaintiff's at-
torneys could have any significant impact on total health care
costs. Further, common sense reveals that an attorney's fee which
is contingent upon a successful recovery will discourage attorneys
from pursuing non-meritorious cases while a fee structure involv-
ing hourly charges, regardless of the outcome, would invoke no eco-
nomic disincentives to the attorney for pursuing non-meritorious
claims.7 0 There is no logical or rational relationship between limi-
tations on attorneys' contingent fees and achieving better health
care for our citizens and there is simply no legitimate state interest
furthered by such a limitation.
Restriction of plaintiff's attorneys' contingent fees in medical
malpractice cases also raises substantive due process issues under
both the United States Constitution and the "law of the land" that
"courts shall be open" requirements of the North Carolina Consti-
tution.7 1 Any statute which tends to impinge upon the right of an
injured person to seek redress of his grievances by preventing him
them to obtain legal representation. The court then reasoned that the reappor-
tionment of damage awards was unlikely to reduce medical malpractice insurance
rates. Therefore, the discriminatory classifications were not justified in terms of
obtaining the legislative goal.
However, a Florida appellate court upheld a statute which made attorney
contingent fees subject to review for reasonableness. See Florida Medical Center,
Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022, 1030 (Fla. 1983) The appellate court held
that the statute did not offend equal protection because it created a reasonable
classification which bore a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative
objective.
The Supreme Court of California held that specific statutorily imposed limits
on contingent fees did not offend equal protection guarantees. See Roa v. Lodi
Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
70. See also Reder, Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special Reference to
Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 218 (Rotten-
berg ed. 1978) (discussing a study which indicates that over 400 attorney hours
are spent on the average malpractice case which results in a "zero recovery" after
trial).
71. N.C. CONST. art I, § 18.
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from freely contracting for the employment of an attorney of his
choice may run afoul of these constitutional guarantees.72 The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the right
of access to the courts can only by restricted where necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest.7"
Restriction of attorneys' contingent fees has also raised other
constitutional problems. At least one state court has overturned
the legislatively imposed restrictions on the basis that they inter-
fered with the judiciary's province to regulate attorney conduct.74
Another state court has specifically stricken such a statute as a vio-
lation of the constitutionally protected freedom of contract.75
In 1976, the North Carolina Professional Liability Insurance
Study Commission rejected any suggestion of controls on contin-
gent fees, as follows:
After hearing various medical, legal and insurance people, the
Commission saw no problems concerning, or evidence of, abuse of
contigency fees, and therefore it does not recommend legislation
to regulate attorneys' fees in malpractice actions."'
As a practical matter, the contingent fee system is essential for vic-
tims in most personal injury cases to have any chance of recovery.
72. Statutes imposing limitations on attorney contingent fees restrict a negli-
gently injured victim's right to redress of grievances in a number of ways. Because
contingent fees are limited only in medical malpractice cases and since the costs
to the attorney are much lower in general personal injury, the plaintiff bar is
likely to abandon the medical malpractice field. See Chief Justice Bird's dissent
in Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93. Those lawyers who
do continue to take medical malpractice cases may still be forced to exclude cer-
tain plaintiffs with valid claims. In states which impose a fixed percentage limita-
tion, there may be no incentive for attorneys to take smaller claims. In states
where there is a sliding scale contingent fee limitation, attorneys may be dis-
suaded from taking the more complicated and time-consuming actions.
73. The right of access to the courts for the resolution of civil disputes be-
tween private parties is encompassed by the right of petition protected by the
first amendment. See United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S.
576, 578 (1971).
First amendment rights can be restricted only where there is a compelling
state interest. See Buckley v. Valeo, 429 U.S. 1, 51-54 (1976).
74. Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983). The Pennsylvania
court in this case held that regulating the bar and disciplining lawyers are judicial
functions protected against legislative incursion. Consequently, they determined
that a statute fixing the contingent fee in medical malpractice actions violated the
separation of powers clause.
75. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 945, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (1980).
76. STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 34.
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Hourly legal fees are simply prohibitive for most citizens in any
type of substantial dispute." Restrictions on attorneys' contingent
fees could have an impact on the number of medical negligence
actions which are filed, but only at the cost of depriving the vic-
tims of legitimate claims under their right to seek compensation.
IV. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The common law collateral source rule is based on the policy
belief that when an injury has been caused by negligence, the
tortfeasor (or his insurer) should bear the cost rather than the vic-
tim, or his insurer, or some third-party benefactor. Any other rule
would create a windfall for the tortfeasor (or his insurer) and
would unfairly penalize the victim who gave wage concessions or
paid his own insurance premiums in order to generate the "collat-
eral source. '7' Even if a tort victim had not paid any insurance
premiums and even if the victim's insurance coverage was unre-
lated to his employment, an exclusion of recovery on collateral
source payments would require third-party benefactors or the pub-
lic7 19 to subsidize the negligence of the tortfeasor. The abolition of
the collateral source rule would require the public and the victim
to underwrite the cost of malpractice and would reduce economic
incentives for removing bad doctors from the practice of medicine.
The argument for abolition of the collateral source rule is that
the rule affords plaintiffs a "double recovery." Initially, this argu-
ment fails to recognize that the third-party payer is often entitled
to reimbursement out of the medical negligence recovery. For ex-
ample, health insurance contracts often include a subrogation
clause entitling the insurance company to such reimbursement. Of
course, the concept of a "double recovery" for a tort victim is
hollow, when one considers that litigation is an expensive proposi-
tion and the costs of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses must
be deducted from the amount which a jury has determined to be a
77. The following studies conclude that most middle and lower income Amer-
icans do not have the means to hire a lawyer for a personal injury case on an
hourly basis: Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee
in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 (1970); REDER,
supra note 70, at 231.
78. See generally, Schwartz, The Collateral-Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REV. 348
(1961).
79. Under existing law, if a patient receives medicaid or medicare payments
which are later recovered from a tortfeasor, the appropriate government agency is
entitled to reimbursement of those payments out of the recovery.
1986]
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fair compensation for the victim's injury.80
Despite the sound policy behind the collateral source rule,
many state legislatures have abolished or largely modified the rule
in medical malpractice actions.8 ' Some states have abolished the
collateral source rule except with regard to collateral sources that
the tort victim has paid to receive. 2 Other states have abolished
the rule to the extent that no right to subrogation exists.83 Alterna-
tively, some states have abolished the rule while prohibiting such
subrogation rights.84
The states abrogating or modifying the collateral source rule
vary in the procedure used to calculate damages. Some allow the
jury to calculate the amount of recovery by determining damages,
then subtracting the amount of funds received from collateral
sources.8 " Under other statutes, the jury simply determines the to-
tal amount of damages and the trial court then subtracts the
80. Generally, fees and costs account for a substantial proportion of the re-
covery in medical malpractice actions. See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMIS-
SION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, at 983.
81. The collateral-source rule has been abolished or modified with regard to
medical malpractice claims in the following states: (a) Alaska [ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.548(b) (1983)]; (b) Arizona [ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (1982)]; (c) Cali-
fornia [CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (Supp. 1986)1; (d) Connecticut [1985 Conn. Acts
53641]; (e) Delaware [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 1984)]; (f) Florida
[FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (Supp. 1986)]; (g) Idaho [IDAHO CODE § 39-4210 (1985)]; (h)
Illinois [ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, § 2-1205 (1983)]; (i) Kansas [KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-471 (1983)]; (j) Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (1984)]; (k) New Hamp-
shire [N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7-i (1983)]; (1) New York [N.Y. CIv. PRAC. §§
4010, 5031 (Supp. 1986)]; (m) North Dakota [N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-08
(1978)]; (n) Ohio [OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (1981)]; (o) Pennsylvania [X
PA. CONG. STAT. § 1301.62 (1985)]; (p) Rhode Island [R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34
(1979)]; (q) South Dakota [S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-12 (1979)]; (r) Ten-
nessee [TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (1980)]; (s) Utah [1985 Utah Laws § 78-14-
4.5]; (t) Washington [WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1986)].
82. States abolishing the collateral source rule except to the extent of collat-
eral sources the victim has paid to receive include the following: New Hampshire,
New York, and Tennessee. See supra note 81.
83. States abolishing the collateral source rule to the extent that no right to
subrogation exists include the following: Florida, Illinois, and South Dakota. See
supra note 81.
84. States abolishing the rule while prohibiting subrogation rights include the
following: Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania. See supra note 81.
85. New Hampshire has enacted a statute directing juries to calculate the
amount of damages minus the amount received from collateral sources. See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7-i (1983).
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amount received from collateral sources.86 Other states simply al-
low evidence of funds paid to the tort victim by collateral sources
to be considered by the jury.87
In the mid-1970s, many of the statutory modifications of the
collateral source rule were limited to medical negligence cases.
Such statutes raised equal protection problems similar to those
discussed above, in the context of ceilings on recovery and limita-
tions on contingent fees; at least three states have held such stat-
utes to be a violation of equal protection, 8 while at least one state
has upheld such a statute under an equal protection challenge.8 9
Substantive due process problems" and the constitutionally pro-
tected "right to contract"9 are also raised in some cases.2
86. The Florida statute allows the jury to determine the total amount of
damages to be awarded and directs the trial court to subtract collateral sources.
See FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (Supp. 1986).
87. States allowing evidence of collateral funds include the following: Ari-
zona, California, Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and
Washington. See supra note 81.
88. The following states have held that statutory modifications of the collat-
eral source rule in medical malpractice actions violate equal protection guaran-
tees: (a) Illinois: Wright v. Central DuPage, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
(b) Kansas: Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503, 701 P.2d 939
(1985); (c) New Hampshire: Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
These opinions have reasoned that abolition of the collateral source rule in medi-
cal malpractice actions deprives victims of medical negligence of the benefits of
the rule bestowed on other tort victims. This discrimination is not rationally re-
lated to alleviating the medical malpractice problem. There is no guarantee health
care liability insurers would reduce their premiums if they were not responsible
for amounts paid by collateral sources. Furthermore, even if health care providers'
insurance rates were reduced, the cost of insurance for the public, as potential
victims of medical negligence, would increase.
89. The California Supreme Court held that a statutory modification of the
collateral source rule in that state did not offend equal protection. Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1981).
90. Abrogations and modifications of the collateral source rule infringe on
medical malpractice victims' rights to seek full compensation. The Supreme Court
of North Dakota held that a statute abolishing the collateral source rule in medi-
cal malpractice actions violated substantive due process. See Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). The Supreme Court of California held, on the other
hand, that modifications of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice ac-
tions did not violate substantive due process. See Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1981).
91. An impairment of contract argument was raised in the Nebraska case of
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). In Prendergast, the
statute in question provided that credit be given with respect to the non-refund-
able insurance benefits, less all premiums paid by or for the claimant. The court
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In light of the trend to find such statutes unconstitutional
when limited to medical negligence victims, it is expected that the
current wave of legislative proposals will aim towards eliminating
the collateral source rule as to all tort victims. 93 Indeed, abolition
of the collateral source rule has been identified by some physicians
as their number one legislative priority.94 Essentially, consideration
of the collateral source rule rests on a policy decision as to whether
the full costs of negligent acts should be borne by the tortfeasor,
directly or indirectly through insurance, or whether those costs
should be spread throughout the rest of society.
V. PERIODIC PAYMENTS
One incentive for insurance companies toward the settlement
of large, valid claims is the prospect of negotiating a structured
settlement which allows periodic payments to the injured person
over a specified period of time. In negotiating such installment
payments, patients and their attorneys are aware that money re-
ceived in the future is worth only a fraction of money received in
the present and plaintiffs' attorneys typically calculate the "pre-
sent-value" of such offers before presenting them to a client for
consideration. Of course, if a case goes through trial, a jury is in-
structed to award the present value of all damages-past, present
and future.
Various periodic payment schemes advocated by the insurance
industry attempt to engraft the installment payment plan onto a
jury verdict-which has already been reduced back to present
value by the jury-providing double savings to the insurance car-
rier. Such proposals would serve to reduce incentives for settle-
rejected the impairment of contract argument. Of course, since the statute dealt
solely with non-refundable medical insurance benefits, arguably there was no con-
tract involved in the first place. However, other statutory schemes present the
question of impairment of contract more squarely.
92. For other cases addressing the constitutionality of statutes modifying or
abrogating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions, see: Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Pinnollos v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981); Rudolf v. Iowa Methodist Medical
Center, 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio 316, 343
N.E.2d 832 (1976); Jones v. State Board of Medicine, Nos. 55527 and 55586, slip
ops. (D. Ct. Idaho, Nov. 14, 1980), on remand from 97 Idaho 854, 555 P.2d 399
(1976).
93. The Malpractice War, National Law Journal, Aug. 27, 1984, at 10.
94. Priorities Noted in State Malpractice Relief Legislation, Ob. Gyn. News,
Feb. 1-14, 1985, at 2.
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ment and would simply act as a direct subsidy to the insurance
industry-perhaps an "exclusive emolument" proscribed by the
North Carolina Constitution. 5 Insurance companies have already
learned that they can make huge profits by appealing large jury
verdicts just because the legal rate of interest they must pay on the
verdict during pendency of the appeal is less than the rate of their
investment return."6 Legislatures should be moving towards plug-
ging this loophole by raising the legal rate of interest rather than
creating a new incentive against settlement by offering the insur-
ance companies an interest-free installment option of paying the
verdicts they lose.
Several states have implemented such mandatory periodic
payment schemes in the past.9 7 Some of these statutes simply pro-
vide for periodic payments of awards regardless of the amount of
the award, the kind of damages, or other factors.9 8 Other statutes
mandate periodic payments only where the award exceeds a cer-
tain dollar amount.9 Still others require periodic payments only
on "future damages."100 Some statutes specify that periodic pay-
ments will cease upon the injured person's death while others pro-
95. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32 holds: "No person or set of persons is entitled to
exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consid-
eration of public services." Other state constitutions have similar provisions.
96. In Song v. Smatko, 208 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal. App. 1984), the California
Court of Appeals awarded attorneys' fees plus additional damages to the plaintiff,
finding that the defendant in a medical malpractice case had pursued a frivolous
appeal simply to incur investment of profits on the amount of the jury award
during the pendency of the appeal.
97. The following states have implemented mandatory periodic payment pro-
visions: (a) Alabama [ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1975)]; (b) Alaska [ALASKA STAT. §
9.55.548 (1983)]; (c) Arkansas [ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619 (Supp. 1985)]; (d) Cali-
fornia [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (1980)]; (e) Delaware [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6864 (Supp. 1984)]; (f) Florida [FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (Supp. 1986)]; (g) Kansas
[KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2609 (1983)]; (h) Maryland [MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 2-5-
109 (1978)]; (i) New Hampshire [N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 IV (1983)]; (j)
New York [N.Y. CIv. PRAC. §§ 5031 et seq. (Supp. 1986)]; (k) North Dakota [N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-15 (1978)]; (1) Washington [WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.240
(Supp. 1986)]; (m) Wisconsin [WIs. STAT. § 655.015 (1980)].
98. The following states have enacted this kind of periodic payment statute:
Kansas, Maryland, and Washington. See supra note 97.
99. The following states have enacted statutes mandating periodic payments
if the recovery is over a specified amount: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida,
New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin. See supra note 97.
100. The following states have enacted legislation mandating periodic pay-
ments of future damages: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, New
Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin. See supra note 97.
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vide that the remaining amounts shall be paid to the family of the
deceased. 10 1 To the authors' knowledge, no statute requires that
the payment plan be extended if the injured person outlives his life
expectancy, a proposal which seems to be the natural corollary of
reducing the award if the injured person dies sooner than ex-
pected. The majority of state courts deciding the constitutionality
of the various periodic payment plans have held them to be uncon-
stitutional. 102 Such a result has been reached on equal protection
grounds," 3 substantive due process grounds'0 and "separation of
powers" grounds.105
The human effect of legislatively mandated periodic payments
is demonstrated very poignantly in Florida Medical Center, Inc. v.
Von Stetina.0s In that case, a young, attractive woman was hospi-
talized after an auto accident, and was placed on a respirator. Ap-
101. States which have enacted statutes specifying that periodic payments
will cease upon the injured party's death include the following: Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Florida, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. States which have enacted stat-
utes specifying that periodic payments will go to the injured party's survivors
upon death include the following: Alabama and California. See supra note 97.
102. The constitutionality of mandatory periodic payments of medical mal-
practice recoveries appears to have only been addressed by courts in New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota and Florida. Both New Hampshire and Florida held the in-
volved statutes were unconstitutional. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825 (1980); Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla.
1983). On the other hand, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of mandatory periodic payments. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978).
103. In Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that a statute mandating that any future dam-
ages in excess of $50,000 be paid periodically and stopped upon the plaintiff's
death violated equal protection guarantees. The court reasoned that this statute
unreasonably discriminated against health care defendants and unduly burdened
seriously injured malpractice victims. A similar Florida statute mandating pay-
ment of future damages in periodic payments was also held to violate equal pro-
tection guarantees. See Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina., 436 So. 2d
1022 (Fla. 1983).
104. The court in Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022, held that a statute mandat-
ing periodic payments violated substantive due process guarantees. The court rea-
soned that the statute subverted its own purpose of alleviating the medical mal-
practice crisis by discouraging good faith settlements.
105. The Von Stetina court also held that the state's periodic payment stat-
ute violated the constitutional "separation of powers" clause. As the opinion
stated, "[iut is settled that a trial court with constitutional jurisdiction to render a
final judgment has the 'inherent power . . . to enforce collection of its judg-
ments.'" Id. at 1025.
106. 436 So. 2d 1022.
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parently because of negligence, the patient's
air supply was interrupted and irreversible brain damage ensued,
condemning the plaintiff to a 40 year life expectancy as a pa-
thetic, half-blind, hopelessly bedridden, pain-wracked incompe-
tent who nevertheless can recognize people and respond to
sounds, love, and touch. In the poetic words of her counsel, "She
is a prisoner in her own helpless body and must experience the
ultimate nightmare every waking moment of the remainder of her
tragically destroyed life." 107
In present money value, the jury found that the plaintiff re-
quired approximately $188,400 per year simply to meet her neces-
sary expenses for medical and nursing care. The Florida Periodic
Payment Statute, however, limited the payout per year to
$100,000, an amount which the court noted was "insufficient to
keep her alive," and thus found the statute unconstitutional.' 8
Our jury system has been trusted for centuries with a respon-
sibility of determining reasonable compensation for the victims of
negligence. The jury is instructed to give an award which is re-
duced to present value and it would be manifestly unfair to further
reduce that award by allowing the defendant or his insurer to re-
tain the judgment amount (essentially as an interest-free or low-
interest loan) while paying the victim under a legislatively man-
dated periodic payment scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
Each of the proposals discussed above-ceilings on recoveries,
limitations on contingent fees, abolition or modification of the col-
lateral source rule, and mandated periodic payments-has its own
visceral attractiveness yet has its own injurious effect. In consider-
ing these various proposals now being advanced by the American
Medical Association and the insurance industry, the various state
legislatures should directly face two questions: (1) Would the en-
actment of such a proposal significantly reduce the cost of health
care in our society and/or improve the quality of that health care?
(2) Would the enactment of such a proposal be fair to the injured
victims of negligence and protect their rights to receive full com-
pensation for their injuries? Unless the answer to both of these
questions is a clear "yes" the proposals discussed above should be
107. Id. at 1024.
108. Id. at 1020.
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rejected.
A Rand Institute for Civil Justice study conducted by P.M.
Danzon of Duke University reveals that no more than ten percent
of all actual instances of medical negligence result in the filing of a
claim, and of those, less than half of the claims (representing less
than one out of every twenty-five actual instances of medical negli-
gence) are ever paid."0 9 Other investigators have reached similar
conclusions.110 If the American Medical Association and our legis-
latures desire to honestly improve health care in America and pro-
mote justice for the victims of medical negligence, then they
should be considering proposals quite different from those dis-
cussed above.
Physicians and health care commentators across the United
States recognize that the primary problem in malpractice litigation
is malpractice, itself. In 1985, the Public Citizen Health Research
Group published a report entitled "Medical Malpractice: The
Need For Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Reform." ' That study
advocated a number of proposals to decrease the amount of mal-
practice and therefore the number of malpractice suits, including
the following:
(1) Urging that all doctors pay at least $500 per year for their
medical license, thus raising about $200 million in state revenues
to be used for disciplining doctors.
(2) Passing strong legislation in states to greatly expand the
size and strength of the licensing (doctor discipline) function.
(3) Experience-rating of doctors by insurance companies so
109. P. DANZON, FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
(Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1982); Danzon, An Economic Analysis of Medi-
cal Malpractice, 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 39, 42 (1983).
110. L. POCINCKI, The Incidence of Jatrogenic Injuries, printed as appendix,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2.
A 1976 joint study by the California Hospital Association and the California
Medical Association examined the true incidence of actionable injuries as opposed
to the number of lawsuits filed. Of an approximate 3 million patients, the study
determined that 24,000 had an adverse outcome attributable to medical negli-
gence. During the same year, however, only 4,000 medical malpractice lawsuits
were actually filed in California (and, of those, only one-half resulted in payment).
See Malpractice Costs: The Pressure for Relief Mounts, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS,
July 22, 1985. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of victims of medical negli-
gence are not compensated at all under our present system.
111. Medical Malpractice: The Need for Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Re-
form, supra note 10, cited in Malpractice: A Crisis of Doctors' Making?, National
Law Journal, Sept. 16, 1985.
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the good doctors stop subsidizing the relatively few with worse
performance records.
(4) Requiring attorneys to turn over to state licensing boards
information about doctors after patients prevail in a settlement or
adjudication of a malpractice suit.
(5) Requiring all other data, such as that collected by profes-
sional review organizations (PRO's) concerning doctors' perform-
ance in treating Medicare and Medicaid patients to be made part
of doctors' files in the state licensing bureaus." 2
Health care can best be improved through better review of physi-
cians' performance and such improvement will ultimately result in
lower health care costs for society as a whole.
As a group, American physicians have had the highest mean
income of any group of professionals in the world. 113 Admittedly,
insurance premiums have risen somewhat in recent years, but any
consideration of those increases would be incomplete without con-
sidering the context of the amount of physicians' incomes. Those
physicians who complain that the present state of liability for
health care providers represents a new "low" in physician account-
ability should reflect upon the Code of Hammurabi adopted some
4,000 years ago in ancient Babylon. This early legal code adopted a
policy of strict liability for a bad result with non-monetary (and no
doubt uninsurable) compensation, as follows:
If the surgeon has made a deep incision in the body of a free
man and has caused the man's death or has opened the carbuncle
in the eye and so destroys the man's eye, they shall cut off his
forehand. 1 4
With responsibility comes accountability, and physicians, like
other members of society, should be fully and fairly responsible for
compensating the injured victims of medical negligence. The cost
of such medical negligence insurance is a small price for our society
to pay for the preservation of our tort system and the continued
right of all injured persons to be "made whole" in our democratic
society.
112. Id.
113. For example, in 1982, the median gross income for North Carolina phy-
sicians was reported to be $153,750 (compared to an average annual insurance
premium of $1,400). Briggs, supra note 25. at 4, citing Medical Economics (Feb.
6, 1984).
114. C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (4th ed. 1976), citing 2 BABYLON LAW
§ 218, at 81 (1955).
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